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This papers studies the eﬀects on service quality and consumer surplus of a
minimum price which is ﬁxed by a bureaucratic non-monopolistic professional
association. It shows that the price ﬂoor set by a Niskanen-type professional
assocation will maximize consumer surplus only if consumers demand the high-
est possible average quality. If consumers demand services of lesser quality,
the association’s price ﬂoor will be too high if measured by consumer sur-
plus. Moreover we show that a de-regulated market will always reproduce the
favorable result of a uniformly high price in the case of top quality demand
while delivering superior results in the case of a mixed demand for high and
low quality services. The general picture that emerges from this discussion
is that the current EU Commission’s initiative to abolish ﬁxed price schemes
for professional services will not lead to a decrease in quality that would be
undesirable from a standpoint of consumer protection. This holds even if we
acknowledge the opponent’s claim that there is a chance of deprivation of
professional ethics due to price competition.
Key words: Liberal professions, price regulation, quality, professional associa-
tion, self-regulation, EU competition policy, intrinsic motivation
JEL-classiﬁcation: L15, J44, K21
1 Introduction
Liberal professions such as lawyers, notaries, accountants, architects, engineers and pharam-
cists are highly regulated throughout Europe. A recent EU report highlights anti-competitive
∗The authors are with DIW Berlin. e-mail: gmeran@diw.de, and rschwarze@diw.de. A preliminary
version of this paper has been presented at the Annual Meeting 2004 of the Verein f¨ ur Socialpolitik.
1practices, such as restrictions on entry, ﬁxed or recommanded prices, and limits on ad-
vertisement, for ”a large number of the EU professions” (Paterson et al. 2003)1. The
European Commission is undertaking aggressive eﬀorts to limit such practices as part
of its Lisbon strategy of becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world by 2010. In its recent Internal Market Strategy for Services, the
Commission sets up a programme to screen each member state’s regulations on profes-
sional services with the stated aim ”to abolish any rules that produce anti-competitive
eﬀects without being objectively necessary and the least restrictive means to guarantee the
proper practice of the profession”2. It also considers to take legal action against member
state’s regulations of professional services at the European Court of Justice in Luxem-
bourg. 3 A key target of the EU-Commission is ”the abolition of minimum, maximum or
suggested fee scales” for professional services 4.
Professional associations challenge this initiative by pointing to the inherent dangers of
lifting price regulations. They argue that ﬁxed prices are necessary to allow professionals
”to make a reasonable proﬁt and to exercise their functions in honour and dignity”,
suggesting that price competition would force professionals to reduce the quality of their
services 5. The Commission openly disregards any such fears. Following the viewpoint
of Advocate General L´ eger of the European Court of Justice, expressed in his Opinion
in the famous Arduino case, the Commission ”fails to see how a system of mandatory
prices would prevent members of the profession from oﬀering inadequate services if, in
any event, they lacked qualiﬁcations, competence or moral conscience”6.
This papers tries to shed some light on this essentially economic debate. Departing from
the concept of ”reasonable proﬁt” as a precondition for professional ethics, we study the
eﬀects on service quality and consumer surplus of a minimum price which is ﬁxed by a
bureaucratic, i.e. non-monopolistic professional association. Our main results are that
the price ﬂoor set by a Niskanen-type professional association will maximize consumer
surplus only if consumers demand the highest possible average quality. If consumers
demand services of lesser quality, the association’s price ﬂoor will be too high if measured
by consumer surplus. Moreover we show that a de-regulated market will always reproduce
the favorable result of a uniformly high price in the case of top quality demand, while
delivering superior results in the case of a mixed demand for high and low quality services.
Surprisingly the average quality is even higher in a de-regulated market than in a self-
regulated market. The general picture that emerges from this discussion is that the
1For a comparative analysis in the OECD countries see OECD (2000).
2The Internal Market Strategy for Services is documented on the DG competition website
at: (europa.eu.int/comm/internal market/en/services/services/com888en.pdf. The Quotation is taken
from the former Commissioner Montis speech at the Conference on Professional Regulation (eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2003 028 en.pdf)
3Speciﬁcally in the case of Belgian architects’ honorary system: europa.eu.int/comm/ inter-
nal market/en/qualiﬁcations/99-593.htm.
4europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2003 028 en.pdf.
5For an overview of diﬀerent viewpoints of this sort: europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ liberaliza-
tion/conference/summary of consultation responses.pdf.
6Court of Justice of Arduino case, as quoted by Commissioner Montis (eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2003 028 en.pdf)
2abolition of ﬁxed price schemes for professional services will never essentially lead to a
decrease in quality that would be undesirable from a standpoint of consumer protection -
even if we assume that there is a chance of deprivation of professional ethics due to price
competition.
Our paper is mainly institutional. It re-constructs and discusses existing regulations on
professionals and their proclaimed rationale in a rigorous economic model. It ties to
diﬀerent strands of economic literature.
The most closely related literature addresses the issue of occupational licensing (see e.g.
Rottenberg (1980), Faure et al. (1993), Kleiner (2000) for a brief overview). The licensing
literature can be broadly split into two groups - the ”private interest view” on licensing
and its counterpart, the ”public interest view”. The private interest view follows Stigler’s
generalized private interest theory of regulation (Stigler 1971). It views entry restrictions
as a rent-seeking device of a cartel-like acting regulatory entity, in our case the profes-
sional association. Not surprisingly, this theory recommends the abolition of occupational
licensing or at least some lifting of access barriers (e.g. Friedman and Friedman 1963,
Rometsch and Wolfstetter 19937). The public interest view of licensing departs from
an Akerlof-type imperfect information problem (Akerlof 1970, Maurizi 1974). It views
occupational licensing as means to select provider quality (e.g. Leland 1979) or as an
instrument to reward occupation-speciﬁc human capital investment (e.g. Shapiro 1983).
The latter theories tend towards a more balanced judgement on licensing, weighing the
beneﬁts of enhanced quality performance against the regulatory costs. A general ﬁnd-
ing of the public interest view is that licensing has an important distributional eﬀect: It
beneﬁts consumers who value high quality at the expense of consumers who prefer lower
quality services at lower prices (Shapiro 1986). Our paper combines both approaches. We
assume an imperfect information setting while at the same time allowing a corporatistic
entity - the professional association - to ﬁx entry barriers and a minimum price in order
to stabilize income (per unit) in the immediate interest of the association’s members.
However, since a stable income (per unit) is having a positive spill-over eﬀect on service
quality in our model, the market control of the association has a potentially beneﬁcial
role from a private and public interest point of view.
Another strand of literature pertinent to our discussion analyzes the eﬀect of price regula-
tion on product quality. Departing from the ﬁnding that imperfectly competitive markets
undersupply product quality (following the seminal work of Spence 1975), it discusses
how price ﬂoors or more complex fee schedules induce higher choices of quality. An in-
teresting result of this literature is that minimum prices exhibit an U-shaped relationship
with average product (or service) quality, i.e. average quality decreases at low price ﬂoors
(as some ﬁrms specialize in low quality-low price products) and it increases at high price
ﬂoors (as ﬁrms symmetrically choose a suboptimal high quality; see Kamien and Vincent
1991). In diﬀerence to this literature we study a competitive supply structure that is fully
regulated (in quantity and price) by a bureaucratic professional association.
Finally our results relate to the literature on intrinsic motivation and reciprocity (e.g.,
Frey 2000, Fehr and G¨ achter 2000). This literature looks at the economics and psycho-
7These literature has a great overlap with a critical literature on labor unions (see Kleiner (2000)).
3mechanics of an observed behaviour of ”acting without reward”. It is driven by a desire
to introduce facts from motivational psychology into a more complex economic theory
of individiual behaviour. Our approach diﬀers from this literature in that we model
intrinsic motivation as a state-dependent attribute of individuals. It rules the behaviour
of individuals if, and only if, a suﬃcient reward (”decent income”) is given. If a service
is not fairly honored, or if it does not provide the income for a decent living, suppliers
”retaliate” with low quality. In other words, we assume that professional ethics can be
deprived.8
2 The model setting
The model depicts a market under asymmetric information. Consumer demand services
the quality of which cannot be observed at the time the purchases take place. Later,
quality can be assessed but is not veriﬁable9. Hence, contracts that comprise quality
as an argument are not feasible and consumers resort to estimate the average quality of
service that can be inferred from experiences in the past or other sources of information
(newspapers, etc.). Suppliers oﬀer their services at two diﬀerent levels of quality: low
quality (q) and high quality (¯ q).
The supplier’s decisions of how much quality will be oﬀered depends upon the income
they earn for every order and upon their attitude towards serving high quality. There
are some intrinsically motivated suppliers who care about quality and there are other
suppliers who don’t care about quality irrespectively of how much they earn. The latter
group is the type of economic agent without moral conscience that Advocate General
L´ eger in his opinion on the Arduino case (op. cit. 6) seems to refer to.
Market demand can be derived from the aggregation of consumer’s individual demand for
services. We assume that each consumer buys only one unit of service. We further assume
that consumers diﬀer with respect to their appreciation of service quality. Let δ ∈ [δ, ¯ δ]
be a utility index of consumer type δ reﬂecting her attitude towards quality. Then, if
δ(E[Q(p)] + a) − p ≥ 0 (1)
she will buy a service unit. Here, E[Q(p)] is the average service quality observable and
p is the price per service unit. a denotes a parameter indicating the valuation of the
pure quantitative existence of the product (or service). This implies that there remains a
demand for the product even if quality is zero.
Total demand for services can be derived by introducing a density function f(δ) ≥ 0,∀δ ∈
[δ, ¯ δ], rearranging (1) and aggregating over all consumer types exhibiting a δ ≥ Ω(p) :=





8This interpretation literally corresponds to the famous ”First comes the grub, then the morals” of
Bertold Brecht in his Three-Penny Opera.
9This type of goods are called experience goods. See e.g. Liebeskind and Rumelt (1989).
4In the following we set without loss of generality δ = 0.
Suppliers are characterized by their ability as well as their willingness to provide good
quality. Both properties independently inﬂuence the quality performance of suppliers. To
capture the ability of providers to provide quality we introduce a variable c ∈ [c,¯ c] , where
high values of c indicate low professional abilities and vice versa. In other words, high
value suppliers have high costs for good service quality, and low value supplier are able
to provide good quality at low costs. c is distributed according to the density function
g(c) ≥ 0,∀c ∈ [c,¯ c], where c is set equal to zero. The willingness to provide good quality
is taken in to account by the probability π,0 < π ≤ 1, to do so. It can be thought
of as function of ”moral conscience” or intrinsic motivation, which clearly needs to be
separated from the qualiﬁcation and competence of the individual provider. To keep the
model simple we assume a uniform probability10 π, i.e. the individual probability does
not depend on the ability expressed by c. Additionally, we set c = 0 to simplify.
Suppliers incur production costs11
C(q,c) = cq, q ∈ {¯ q,q}, c ∈ [c,¯ c]. (3)
For simplicity we assume that each supplier produces only one good and c = q = 0. A
decent price and decent income therefore falls into one.
To derive total supply and average service quality we have to focus on the quality decision
of suppliers type c ∈ [0,¯ c]. c indicates the costs of producing a certain quality level. Again,
we assume that c has a uniform density function g(c) = 1/(¯ c) ≥ 0,∀c.
It is here, the principle of ”reasonable proﬁt”12 comes to play it’s pivotal role in the model.
If proﬁts per service unit exceed a threshold value A then a supplier will oﬀer high quality
with a probability13 π,0 < π ≤ 1. Formally:
p − c¯ q ≥ A ⇒ q
∗ = ¯ q, (4)
where q∗ indicates his quality decision. Otherwise, he will oﬀer only low quality, i.e.
q∗ = q = 0. If proﬁts turn negative then the supplier will decline to oﬀer any services, i.e.
leave the market:
p − cq < 0 ⇒ exit. (5)




0 forp ≤ 0
x forp > 0 (6)
where x is the overall level of suppliers.
10To make the probabilities dependent on c makes the model considerably more complicated.
11To keep the model as simple as possible we abstract from non-linear costs and ﬁxed costs.
12The notion of ”reasonable proﬁt” is often interpreted to include an aspect of entitlement, i.e. the
right of a qualiﬁed supplier to receive the ”fair value” of his eﬀort. Our deﬁnition only captures the
economic content of it.
13To keep the model simple we assume that π does not depend on c, i.e. the supplier’s productivity
and his inclination to oﬀer high quality are independent.
5x is controlled by means of occupational licensing. However, occupational licensing does
not serve as a direct control for the quality spectrum of suppliers, e.g. by setting minimum
requirements of human capital investments (skills). It rather inﬂuences the average quality
of services indirectly by its eﬀect on ”reasonable proﬁt” and intrinsic motivation.





(p − A)/¯ q ¯ c
s
Within the interval [(p − A)/¯ q,¯ c] supplier oﬀer only low quality q. This diﬀers from
interval [c,(p − A)/¯ q] where proﬁt per service unit is ”reasonable” (see (4)). Here, the
decision to oﬀer high quality depends on the inclination to do so (probability π).
Having derived the behaviour of suppliers we are now ready to calculate the average
quality of services oﬀered in the market. We simply have to aggregate the two quality




≤ c ≤ ¯ c)q + (1 − π)P(c ≤
p − A
¯ q




where P(.) are the respective probabilities. Recalling our assumption q = c = 0 and the
density function g(c) (7) reduces to
EQ(p) = π¯ q
Z (p−A)/¯ q
0




Obviously, EQ(p) is a monotonically increasing, almost everywhere diﬀerentiable function





0 for0 < p < A
π¯ q
(p−A)/¯ q
¯ c forA ≤ p ≤ ¯ c¯ q + A
π¯ q forp > ¯ c¯ q + A
(9)
Inserting (9) into the deﬁnition of Ω(p) we have




p/a for0 < p < A
p¯ c
π(p−A)+¯ ca forA ≤ p ≤ ¯ c¯ q + A
p
π¯ q+a forp > ¯ c¯ q + A
(10)
Utilizing (2) and (10) we can distinguish two diﬀerent types of demand functions depend-

























































The three intervals of (10) I1 = {p : 0 < p < A} , I2 = {p : A ≤ p ≤ ¯ c¯ q + A} and
I3 = {p : p > ¯ c¯ q + A} are indicated by the three vertical lines. The slope of the demand
curve in I1 and I3 are always negative. The slope in I2 depends on Ω0(p). It is related to
the elasticity of average quality with respect to the price. If the elasticity exceeds 1 then
the demand curve increases in p and vice versa. From (2) it easy to show that
sign[D
0(p)] = −sign[Ω







1/a for0 < p < A
¯ c(¯ ca−πA)
(π(p−A)+¯ ca)2 forA ≤ p ≤ ¯ c¯ q + A
1
π¯ q+a forp > ¯ c¯ q + A
(12)




EQ(p)+a. If the expected quality in the market rises sharply as a result of higher
pay, then Ω0(p) will be negative and the demand for services will have positive slope. If,
on the other hand, the average quality in the market responds inelastically on prices, the
marginal beneﬁt will rise less than prices and the demand cure will be downward sloping.
14See Wilson (1980).
7In the following, it is important to determine how the consumer surplus depends on p.




(δ(EQ(p) + a) − p)f(δ)dδ (13)
Dividing by EQ + a yields:
CS(p) = (EQ(p) + a)
Z ¯ δ
Ω(p)
(δ − Ω(p))f(δ)dδ (14)
If we recall that δ is uniformly distributed we can write
CS(p) = (EQ(p) + a)
 




Inserting (9) and (10) yields
CS(p)

   
   
a
(¯ δ−p/a)2
2¯ δ for0 < p < A
(
π¯ q(p−A)




2¯ δ forA ≤ p ≤ ¯ c¯ q + A




2¯ δ forp > ¯ c¯ q + A
(16)
From (16) we can infer some properties of CS(p). It is easy to see that CS(p) is decreasing
∀p ∈ {I1,I3} if one inserts the relevant expressions from (9) and (10) into (13). The
characteristics in I2 depend upon those of Ω(p). If Ω0(p) < 0,∀p ∈ I2, then CS(p) is
increasing. If Ω0(p) > 0,∀p ∈ I2 then CS0(p) can have either sign. The following ﬁgure




































































3 The Self-Regulated Market
The market access and the prices for professional services are in many European countries
controlled by professional associations, often in subtle ways such as restrictions on multi-
disciplinary cooperation or mandatory memberships. This form of self-regulation has
been subject to many criticism. Critics point to the potential abuse of power to exploit
consumers in a monopolistic fashion (Friedman and Friedman (1963), Stigler (1971)).
A modern day’s institutional answer to this critique is a procedural separation of the
formal power to legally ﬁx the price and entry rules (done by a state entity) from the
informal power to establish the economic rationale behind such settings (done by the
associations). Another institution to solve this potential conﬂict of interest is to tie the
(formal or informal) regulatory power of the associations to public interests. Typically,
professional associations bind themselves by internal constitution to serve and safeguard
market-wide high quality services by, amongst other things 15, securing a ”decent earning”
for as many members as possible. In this section we assume this optimistic view of self-
regulation to evaluate the quality and consumer protection eﬀects it produces (neglecting
the more fundamental Stigler-type objections against it).
15Other ways of safe-guarding high quality services are codes of conduct, complaint procedures, pro-
hibitions against certain business relationships and professional indemnity insurance (see OECD (2000)
for an overview of professional practices).
9The self-regulated market in our model is characterized by a professional association (PA)
the membership of which is mandatory. PA regulates the access (this is the level x) and
the price to maintain a reasonable proﬁt (and hence quality) for as many members as

















0 for0 < p < A
p−A
¯ c¯ q¯ δ (¯ δ −
p¯ c
π(p−A)+¯ ca) forA ≤ p ≤ ¯ c¯ q + A
(¯ δ −
p
π¯ q+a) forp > ¯ c¯ q + A
(19)
Similar to CS(p), Zpa(p) exhibits some characteristics that depend on EQ(p) and Ω(p).
Lemma 1
1. The number of members earning a suﬃciently high income is zero for p ∈ I1.
2. For p = A we have Z0
pa(p) > 0 which implies that there exists an interval E ∈ I2
where Z0
pa(p) > 0.
3. Zpa(p) is decreasing ∀p ∈ I3
4. If Ω0(p) < 0, i.e. if the demand curve is upwards sloping for p ∈ I2, then Zpa(p) is
increasing ∀p ∈ I2.
5. If Ω0(p) > 0, i.e. if the demand function is downwards sloping, then Zpa(p) is a
strictly concave function and may attain a maximum in I2.
Proof in the appendix
The following ﬁgure displays Zpa for the various cases. The association has no concern
for suppliers in I1since members would be are serving the market at an unreasonably
low proﬁt. Zpa in I2 reﬂects the market response to quality services. The association
experiences a monotonous increase in decently working members if the market responds
elastically to improved quality (Ω0(p) < 0). It has interior maximum membership if
the market’s response to quality provision is inelastic (Ω0(p) > 0). In I3 suppliers earn
a unreasonably high proﬁt which by deﬁnition does not contribute to the professional
association’s objective function. Its membership decreases because of the market response




























The main question to be addressed in this section is whether a professional association
contributes to consumer protection or conﬂicts with it. Deﬁne the consumer surplus
maximizing price as p∗, i.e. p∗ = argmaxp[CS(p)], and the association’s utility maximizing
price as ppa, i.e., ppa = argmaxp[Zpa(p)].
Proposition 1 Assume, that the consumer surplus maximizing price p∗ leads to the high-





If p∗ is such that EQ(p∗) < π¯ q, i.e. consumer surplus maximizing average quality is below




Notice also by lemma 1.2 that ppa is such that EQ(ppa) > 0.
Proof: The proof is rather extensive and, therefore, delegated to the appendix.
The purpose of the association to maximize the number of members with a suﬃciently
high income would be in accordance with the goal of consumer protection if consumer’s
surplus is maximized by increasing the price such that the highest quality is induced. This
is so because the maximization of quality requires to increase the price to assure that all
members earn an income at least as high as A. Both groups of market participants,
producers and consumers, are interested in a corner solution where the price induces
maximum average quality. Hence, both share the same interest.
Contrary, if p∗ implies an average quality below its maximum possible, than the group’s
interests fall apart and the tendency of the association to put weight on suﬃciently high
producer’s income leads to a price above the price that maximizes consumer surplus.
114 The De-regulated Market
So far, we have analyzed the case of a professional association that acts as a complete
market maker, setting one price mandatory for all members and regulating access through
its mandatory membership. The latter is similar to and may therefore be called occupa-
tional licensing ”on the part of the association”. In the following we want turn to the
case of a de-regulated market the main characteristics of which are free market prices
and the absence of mandatory membership. The access to the market, however, shall
remain restricted by some form of occupational licensing ”on the part of the state”. Re-
striction on market entry will apply in both regimes because certain entry qualiﬁcations
are needed to deliver professional services which are usually acquired at some institu-
tions of higher education. The throughput-decision of these outside institutions are in
reality only loosely related to the market demand for professionals (e.g. controlled by
a central governing board for higher education as in Germany). We may therefore take
their supply as given. The assumption of a given number of qualiﬁed professionals (with
diﬀerent production costs) for both the self-regulated and the de-regulated market serves
in our model to discuss the partial equilibrium eﬀect of diﬀerent pricing regimes ceteris
paribus. If we would allow for open access in the course of de-regulation, we would have
a perfectly unlimited supply of least cost providers which would drive the market price at
this level. This would overstate the eﬃciency enhancing eﬀect of de-regulation because
the opportunity costs of labor would not be considered in such scenario. We would need
to apply a general equilibrium model to capture these balancing eﬀects.
In a market with no restrictions on price formation, price discrimination according to
service quality may occur which in the literature is called a reputation equilibrium16.
In our model, a reputation equilibrium is a separating equilibrium with two prices, one
price for high quality and one for low quality. High quality is oﬀered by a professional
association of voluntary membership and low quality is oﬀered by the remaining suppliers
without any kind of self-organization.
A high quality supplier signals his service attitude by means of a high price while a low
price oﬀer signals a low quality service attitude. This signaling solves the problem of
adverse selection but it does not solve the moral hazard problem of a free rider passing
the required access investments but supplying low quality for a high price, i.e. the L´ eger
problem of lacking ”moral conscience” (op. cit.). Hence, the key driver of a reputational
equilibrium is the a high price that assures a suﬃciently high income to enforce high
quality services. Even in this case, quality is not always at its maximum ¯ q. However,
consumers know by experience that high price providers sell their services for the highest
average quality possible, i.e. EQ(ph) = π¯ q where ph is the price of the high quality
market.
To deﬁne a separating equilibrium we ﬁrst look at what kind of consumers choose a low or
a high quality of services. Utilizing (1) we have utility for customers buying high quality
U
h = δ(q
h + a) − p
h ≥ 0 (22)
16See Shapiro (1986).
12where qh = π¯ q and
U
l = δ(q
l + a) − p
l ≥ 0 (23)





















Ul = δ(ql + a) − pl








All consumers with δ ∈ [pl/a,Φ] buy low quality ql = 0 and consumers with δ ∈ (Φ,δ]
chose high quality qh = π¯ q, where Φ = (ph − pl)/π¯ q can be calculated from Uh = Ul.
Similar, suppliers are grouped according to their costs. If
p
h − c¯ q ≥ A (26)
suppliers choose to voluntarily join the high-quality segment and oﬀer high quality with
probability π . Otherwise they oﬀer low quality for pl > 0.





























13These two equation determine the equilibrium prices ph and pl.
To compare the regulated market with a reputation equilibrium we have to recall that
they diﬀer solely by price formation. While the former market is characterized by a
uniform price set by a professional association covering all suppliers the latter allows for
two prices. The access to the market, denoted by x, shall be the same. We can think of
the following scenario. Assume the market is initially fully regulated and the association
has maximized the number of its members with suﬃcient income (Zpa). What would
happen, ceteris paribus, if prices were de-regulated and the mandatory membership was
abolished? The following proposition resumes the main results.
Proposition 2 Assume the mandatory association sets the price such that EQ(ppa) < π¯ q,





and average quality in a de-regulated market is higher than in a regulated market. The
eﬀects on consumer surplus are indeterminable.
If the association sets the price ppa such that EQ(ppa) = π¯ q then a separating equilibrium












Ul = δ(ql + a) − pl
Uh = δ(qh + a) − ph








Figure 6 depicts consumer surplus or net utility U of consumers as a function of their
preferences for quality δ and the price level p. pl/a and ph/(qh + a) mark the minimal
preferences for quality needed to exhibit (positive) demand; Φ depicts the critical level of
quality preference for switching from low to high quality services. The critical range of
average quality preferences lies between pl/a and Φ.
14The picture shows that the impact of deregulation on consumer surplus is indetermined.
For low δ, consumer utility is higher under a self-regulated market, whereas for high quality
preferences (high δ) utility in a deregulated market is higher than under the uniform price
set by an professional association.
More precisely, to compare (14) with the consumer surplus under a reputational equilib-




pl/a[δ(ql + a) − pl)f(δ)]dδ (30)
+
R ¯ δ
Φ[δ(qh + a) − ph)f(δ)]dδ (31)
Adding and subtracting
R ¯ δ


























h(δ − Φ)f(δ)dδ (33)













h(δ − Φ)f(δ)dδ (34)
This result can easily be interpreted. Since average quality EQ(ppa) does not exceed
highest quality qh = π¯ q the consumer surplus of the deregulated market tends to be
higher in a reputational equilibrium than under the regime of a professional association.
On the other hand, the weights attached to the qualities aﬀect the equation in the opposite
direction. The weight attached to the average quality is higher than the weight attached
to the high quality.
5 Summary
What would happen if the EU Commission would abolish all minimum prices for pro-
fessional services in Europe? According to opponents from the league of professional
associations, we would see prices come down but also a decline of service quality and
work dignity. If, for the sake of the argument, we follow this critique and assume that
the quality of professional services is conditional upon the intrinsic motivation of service
providers, and if we moreover assume that the intrinsic motivation of service providers
rests upon a ”reasonable proﬁt”, we would want to know whether the decline of service
quality would indeed accrue and whether it runs in or against the interest of consumers.
The answers to these questions are not straightforward because of several countervailing
eﬀects, mainly of institutional nature.
15First, the assurance of service quality through a uniform pricing scheme leads to a quality
of services that can be too high on average, if consumers value quality in a way that the
demand quantity decreases with the price.
Second, high quality of services, if it is not the highest possible quality, could be also too
low on average in a selfregulatd market if the spectrum of quality demanded is such that
a group of consumers desire highest quality. A reputational equilibrium would serve this
group at a targeted higher price while other consumers are served at a lower price for
lower quality. The uniform pricing schemes of the association can not ﬁx this match.
The goal of the professional association to have a large membership of ”honorable man”
(with a decent income and a dignitable work morale) may therefore in several ways conﬂict
with the quality goal of consumers.
In this paper we have shown that a minimum price which is ﬁxed by a Niskanen-type
professional association will generally not serve the consumers if there is a demand for a
variety of low and high quality services. If the price is ﬁxed so that quality is somewhere
below the top but beyond the lowest possible quality, it will hurt top quality demand
while low quality preferences are better oﬀ compared to a reputational equilibrium (see
ﬁst term on the r.h.s. of eq. (34)).
Moreover, we have demonstrated that a de-regulation of a pre-existing ﬁxed price scheme
will never lead to a decrease in service quality. Even if the professional association prefers
top quality, the de-regulated market would produce exactly this average top quality π¯ q.
The EU’s initiative for de-regulation of professional tariﬀs therefore seems in the best
interest of consumers - even if we acknowledge the argument of opponents that there is
a chance of deprivation of professional ethics due to price competition. We even see a
surprising increase of average service quality, if the demand for quality is such that some
top quality segment that would not be served under a uniform pricing scheme will be
served in market without price regulation.
This papers analysis can be extended in many explorative ways, e.g. by introducing open
access or by considering overall welfare eﬀects (including producer surplus). None of this
possible extensions would, according to our expectation, change our result in favor of the
EU’s initiative to de-regulate professional tariﬀs. The present may therefore be seen as
the objectively necessary minimal framework to establish this general result.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(1) follows immediately by (17). (2) can be derived by recalling the deﬁnition of Ω(p) and




¯ c¯ q¯ δ
((¯ δ − Ω(p)) > 0 (35)
Notice, that (¯ δ −Ω(p)) > 0 since we assume the existence of a market equilibrium with positive
demand D(p). (3) follows immediately by inspection of (19). To proof (4) simply observe from
(35) that the sign is unambiguously determined.
16To proof (5) one has to diﬀerentiate Zpa(p) with respect to p. Utilizing the deﬁnitions of Ω(p)


























¯ c(¯ ca − πA)
(π(p − A) + ¯ ca)2, p ∈ I2 (38)
Diﬀerentiating once more yields
Ω00(p) = −
2¯ c(¯ ca − πA)(π(p − A) + ¯ ca)π
(π(p − A) + ¯ ca)4 (39)
= −2Ω0(p)
π
π(p − A) + ¯ ca
, p ∈ I2 (40)
To proof concavity of Zpa we have to determine the negative sign of Z00
pa. After diﬀerentiating
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¯ c¯ q¯ δ

¯ ca
(π(p − A) + ¯ ca)

< 0 (42)
The sign follows by the assumption that Ω0(p) > 0.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The ﬁrst assertion of the proposition can be proved by referring to the deﬁnition of CS(p) and
Zpa (eqs. (16) and (19). The slopes of both objective functions are negative in I3. Hence,
a price p∗ maximizing consumer surplus such that EQ(p∗) = π¯ q requires that CS0(p∗) ≥ 0
for p∗ ∈ I2 as a necessary condition. To prove that ppa = p∗ we ﬁrstly have to show, that
Z0
pa(p∗) ≥ 0. Secondly, we have to assure that there exists no ˆ p ∈ I2 such that Z0
pa(ˆ p) = 0 and
Zpa(ˆ p) > Zpa(p∗).
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
Ω0(p) (43)
Similar, from eqs. (10), (37) and from (15) we can calculate for p ∈ I2
CS0(p) = EQ0(p)
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17To proceed it is helpful to distinguish between the two cases Ω0(p) > 0 and Ω0(p) < 0. If
Ω0(p) < 0,p ∈ I2, i.e. if the demand curve is upwards sloping, then from ( 37) and (44) we can
infer that Z0
pa > 0 and CS0(p) > 0, ∀p ∈ I2 which implies that ppa = p∗.
If Ω0(p) > 0,p ∈ I2, i.e. in the case of a normal demand function, it follows from (44) that
CS0(p) ≥ 0 which implies Z0
pa(p) ≥ 0. By the concavity of Zpa(p) (see lemma 1) it follows
immediately that there cannot exist a ˆ p ∈ I2 such that Z0
pa(ˆ p) = 0. Hence p∗ maximizes Zpa(p).
To prove the second assertion, it is again helpful to distinguish the two cases. If Ω0(p) <
0,∀p ∈ I2, then the consumer surplus maximizing price p∗ must be nil, i.e. p∗ = 0. This
follows immediately from CS0(p∗) ≥ 0,∀p ∈ I2. If the price inducing highest average quality
does not maximize consumer surplus, then only a price inducing lowest average quality will
do. This follows from CS0(p) < 0,∀p ∈ I1 and the assumption of the second assertion. Since
Z0
pa > 0,∀p ∈ I2 and Z0
pa = 0,∀p ∈ I1 it follows that Zpa is maximized for a price inducing
highest average quality. Hence ppa > p∗ = 0.
If Ω0(p) > 0,∀p ∈ I2, a necessary condition for p∗ > 0 is CS0(p∗) = 0,p∗ ∈ I2. From (44) one
can infer that the ﬁrst bracketed term must therefore be positive which implies that Z0
pa > 0
(see (43)). Hence, by the concavity of Zpa(p) it follows that ppa > p∗.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
First we proof that pl < ppa. Adding (27) and (28) and recalling (18) yields







Since total supply x is the same in both regimes total demand must also be the same to assure
market equilibrium. Hence, from (45) it follows




and, since EQ(ppa) > 0 by proposition 1,
pl < ppa (47)
A reputation equilibrium which separates high and low qualities requires by (28)




Utilizing (46) we end up with
ph >





which implies ph > ppa since
π¯ q+a
EQ(ppa)+a > 1.
18To show that average quality in a de-regulated market exceeds that of a price-regulated market








Since ph > ppa it follows from (50) and (8) that EQdereg > EQ(ppa).
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